



ics
Universidad
de Navarra

Institute for Culture and Society

The Ethics of Citizenship in the 21st Century

Friday May 30th & Saturday May 31st, 2014

Institute for Culture and Society – Religion & Civil Society Project

Universidad de Navarra – Pamplona

Theme: *At least since the emergence of the Athenian polis over two millennia ago, citizenship has played a central role in the self-understanding and internal organization of Western societies. Most obviously perhaps, citizenship has served as a marker of “insiders” and “outsiders,” i.e. those who have the full panoply of political and civil rights, including self-government and (in more recent times) welfare, and those who have a more restricted set of rights. In addition, ideals of citizenship, including virtues of law-abidingness, public service, tolerance, and civic friendship have traditionally played a significant role in guiding people’s behaviour and attitudes and in establishing shared parameters of social order. However, it is no longer obvious how or precisely in what form citizenship can continue to serve these functions: With the advent of an increasingly fragmented and globalized world, in which the traditional locus of citizenship, the state, seems to be increasingly threatened in its social relevance and power by global economic actors from without, and by moral, religious, and political tensions from within, the future of citizenship as the proverbial “glue” of society seems less secure. This conference aims to investigate the meaning of citizenship in the modern world, especially with a view to developing ethical ideals of citizenship and public life adapted to contemporary institutions and social practices. Questions to be explored include: Should the central paradigm of citizenship remain state and nation-based, or should traditional state-based paradigms be replaced with a more flexible and cosmopolitan ideal? What role, if any, should religion play in the definition and practice of citizenship? In an increasingly globalized world, is it possible to reconstruct an ideal of citizenship that is “thick” enough to capture our imaginations and loyalty, yet also compatible with a wide array of social, philosophical, and religious allegiances? Indeed, to what extent, if at all, should we continue to rely on traditional political categories such as citizenship to guide our public life?*

Logistics: There would be 7 contributors in all, who would present their papers (45 minutes each) on Friday May 30th and Saturday May 31st. The timetable is designed to make some accommodation for jetlag, hence the 10am start. It is also designed to leave plenty of time for discussion.

PAPERS & CONTRIBUTORS:

1. Conscientious Citizenship: A Philosophical Examination of Conscience Claims in the Public Sphere

AUTHOR :

Dr Angela C Miceli is a Research Fellow at the University of Navarra in Pamplona Spain with the Institute for Culture and Society (Religion and Civil Society Project). In 2013, she received her Ph.D. in political theory from Louisiana State University under the direction of Ellis Sandoz. Her research interests include theories of religious freedom, freedom of conscience and its impact on political society, and ethical discourse in public life. Her recent publications have appeared in *Perspectives on Political Science* and *Public Discourse*.

ABSTRACT:

Citizens in political society often invoke the liberty of conscience to justify their assent or their dissent to laws and policies of the state. Although the concept of liberty of conscience seems to be a *sine non qua* in liberal, democratic political societies, there is increasing conflict about the validity of conscience claims. Disagreements about the source of authority of conscience, the very meaning of conscience, and about moral judgments contribute to this conflict. How then should we think about the role of conscience claims for citizens in the public sphere? This paper examines the validity of conscience claims in the public sphere following two different paradigms. First, it briefly considers the concept of ‘secular conscience’ as outlined in the work of Hannah Arendt. It argues that this concept of conscience is ultimately inadequate to address the fundamental conflicts that challenge conscience claims. The paper then argues that a more robust concept of conscience is needed to navigate these challenges and turns to the work of Thomas Aquinas. The concept of conscience in Aquinas’s work may help to illumine aspects of conscience that impact our understanding of the important role that it plays in the lives of citizens in contemporary political society.

2. Freedom, the Burden of Justice, and the Limits of Rules: A Challenge to Law-Based Approaches to Justice

AUTHOR:

Dr David Thunder is a Research Fellow at the University of Navarra in the Institute for Culture and Society (Religion and Civil Society Project). Prior to this appointment, he held several research and teaching positions in the United States, including visiting assistant professor at Bucknell and Villanova, and Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Princeton University’s James Madison Program. Dr Thunder earned his BA and MA in philosophy at University College Dublin, and his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Notre Dame. His research, which primarily engages the work of late modern and contemporary political philosophers, is concerned with the ethical and psychological dimensions of social order, in particular integrity in public life, the ethics of citizenship, and the virtues of social responsibility. He is currently putting the finishing touches to a book (forthcoming with Cambridge University Press) that makes the case for a deeper harmonisation of our civic roles with our ethical and religious commitments, entitled *Citizenship and the Pursuit of the Worthy Life*. His next project, which is currently in its research phase, will examine the normative relevance of special relationships to the authority and claims of



human associations small and large. In this book project, Dr Thunder aims to develop some guiding norms for achieving a just and sustainable social order, based on a judicious mix of particular allegiances to family, friends, and associates, and more general allegiances to compatriots and fellow humans. Dr Thunder's work has appeared in venues such as the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Political Theory*, and *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*.

ABSTRACT

Many modern approaches to justice assume that justice and its demands have the character of a binding *law*, and tend to conceptualize a just social order less as the intentional, ongoing, and precarious achievement of just and virtuous individuals, and more as the inexorable and enduring operation of a set of institutional and moral constraints upon people's behavior and projects, so as to ensure a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Social order, on this view, is at bottom an elaborate game, and the task of the theorist is to determine which ground rules—which moral and institutional constraints upon individual freedom—can ensure (to the extent practicable) that economic and social interactions and outcomes are fair to all parties involved.

The law-based approach undoubtedly captures important truths about the practice of justice, and cannot be easily dismissed, given that it has some formidable and highly influential representatives, from the classical social contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant up to recent accounts of justice advanced by Rawls, Habermas, Dworkin, Nozick, and Singer. Nonetheless, this approach represents the problem of justice in a way that conceals from view an important and highly consequential fact about the practice of justice, namely that citizens' *creative and prudential exercise of freedom* plays a vital role in the promotion and maintenance of justice, no less than the *constraint* of citizens' freedom by moral and institutional rules. The goal of this paper is to convince the reader that this is indeed a fact, to unpack some of the problems this fact poses for the law-based approach to justice, and to suggest some possible strategies for reframing the problem of justice in a way that is more sensitive to the role of personal initiative in the construction and maintenance of a just society.

3. What is it like to be a good citizen? Civic motivation in the 21st century

AUTHOR:

Dr Simon Keller is Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington. His work is focused on the ethics of special relationships and loyalty, but he has also published on questions about the nature of well-being, time-travel, love, distributive justice, Plato's philosophy of language, and disagreement about climate change. He is the author of *The Limits of Loyalty* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), which won the American Philosophical Association Book Prize in 2009. His most recent book, *Partiality*, was published by Princeton University Press in 2013. He has previously worked at Boston University and the University of Melbourne, and has held visiting positions at Harvard University and Rice University.

ABSTRACT:

The flourishing of states is often linked to the forging of national identities: "creating Italians" or "inventing Australians," for example. Under the associated model of patriotic citizenship, citizens are hoped to give a primary and far-reaching loyalty to the state, and hence to find motivation to



act well as citizens. In the 21st century, states continue to be legally and morally significant entities, and there is good reason to want people to have particularized commitments to their own states. Yet, as states lose their connections with identifiable ethnic histories, as people receive more of their news and entertainment from international sources, and as the major problems we face are increasingly trans-national in nature, the conditions that maintain allegiance to the state as a primary form of identity are ever further undermined. Patriotic citizenship, furthermore, has always brought with it ethical and epistemic dangers, which are arguably exacerbated by recent global changes.

What could take the place of the familiar model of patriotic citizenship? We should start, I suggest, by understanding the complexity of our emotional lives as citizens. A loyalty can be derivative yet very strong, and there are significant forms of emotional commitment apart from loyalty. I sketch a broad picture of the good citizen on which she is not patriotic and does not identify primarily with her country, but on which she nevertheless holds a strong commitment to her country, grounded in an accurate understanding of her place in her local community and the wider world. This model of citizenship, I suggest, is both recognizable and widely achievable. I end by discussing the connection between my picture of the good citizen and the moral emotions more generally.

4. Varieties of Citizenship and the Moral Foundations of Politics

AUTHOR:

Bill English is a political theorist with scholarly interests in ethics, education, political economy, and the biological foundations of human behavior. He is currently a research fellow with the Harvard Initiative for Learning and Teaching, where his work examines the promise and limits of new educational technologies, the value of humanistic, residential, and extra-curricular learning, and questions about civic education and the public role of universities. Bill also serves as a research director for the Edmond J Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University, where he was formerly a Lab Fellow, and he continues to pursue empirical and normative investigations of “institutional corruption” with the Center. Bill received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University writing on the nature of ethical persuasion and its role in institutional change. Following Duke, Bill taught at Brown University as a post-doctoral research associate with the Political Theory Project. His research has appeared in prominent venues, including the *American Political Science Review* and the *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.

ABSTRACT:

Citizenship is inherently an ethical concept, to which claims regarding rights, obligations, and benefits are attached. Moreover, just as such claims can be diverse and overlapping, so too there are different sorts of citizenship, which can be interrelated in different ways. Attending to the varieties of citizenship, however, is difficult given the primacy of the modern state as a political unit. But we can, in fact, be citizens of multiple political bodies, depending on the kinds of allegiance each requires, and understanding this truth is crucial if debates about citizenship are to illuminate political discourse, rather than simply recapitulate existing political differences in less precise terms.

This paper argues that a focus on questions of citizenship is likely to impoverish our political understanding unless we recognize the plural character of citizenship and the ways in which citizenship claims are intricately related to ethical allegiances. By examining the kinds of state functions that are bound up with citizenship debates we can better grasp the larger scope of this



concept and its implications. What these debates show - whether they concern economic distribution, cultural identity, or cosmopolitan travel - is that the bounds of citizenship are inherently moral. These debates also shed light on Augustine's claim that communities are defined by common objects of love. Ultimately, although citizenship can be a useful lens for thinking through practical questions of political agency and political jurisdiction, the concept of citizenship can become a distraction if it does not lead to a deeper consideration of the moral foundations of political communities. Rightly understood, questions of citizenship concern the bounds of communities and the moral obligations and opportunities that accompany them.

5. Autonomy and the Attitude of Toleration

AUTHOR:

Ryan Davis is a graduate fellow at the Edmund J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University. He received a PhD from Princeton University's Program in Political Philosophy. He is centrally interested in the normative importance of respect for persons, which his work considers from a broadly Kantian point of view. He has written about topics including the ethics of democratic participation, international justice, political liberalism, and the grounds of the value of autonomy. Previous work has appeared (or will appear) in journals such as *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Political Studies*, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Religious Studies*, and the *Intercultural Human Rights Law Review*.

ABSTRACT:

Toleration requires taking a positive attitude toward something one also disapproves of. However, adopting two potentially conflicting attitudes can threaten one's integrity. Samuel Scheffler (2010) has called this the "paradox of suppressed disagreement." One way to navigate this paradox is by accepting the authority of values that one disapproves of, for the sake of relationships with those who endorse those values. On what I call the *diversity account* of toleration, it is valuable to live with others in relations of mutual deference to shared values, even if one denies the first-order values themselves. Alternatively, one could tolerate others by supporting their pursuit of their own values, but without participating in disfavored valuing practices. According to what I call the *autonomy account* of toleration, it is valuable to honor another's rational will. The diversity account locates the value of toleration in a relationship of fraternity with others forged through sharing a valuing practice; the autonomy account locates the value of toleration in respect for other's choices. The autonomy account does not insist on any shared valuing practice. I argue that it thereby provides a better response to the paradox of suppressed disagreement. If one disapproves of a value, treating it as authoritative is as likely in actual political contexts to create relationships of conflict as of fraternity. This is because a requirement to share in the values of others raises a question about which value we will together defer to, and this question creates a new site of possible contestation. Such tensions can be alleviated by removing the presumption that tolerating others' values involves doing something together. Toleration among citizens is best imagined as a response to the value of personal autonomy.

6. The affective dimension of citizenship in a changing world

AUTHOR:

Emma Cohen de Lara holds a PhD in political science from the University of Notre Dame, where she was a Fulbright scholar, and master degrees from Leiden University and the London School of



Economics. Emma is currently a lecturer in political theory at Amsterdam University College, which is the honors college of the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. Before coming to AUC, she was assistant professor at the University of Vermont and at VU University Amsterdam. Emma's research interests are citizenship, liberal education, and the history of political thought. She has recently published (in Dutch) on the Dutch citizenship exam and on Tocqueville, civil society and citizenship.

ABSTRACT:

Contemporary literature on citizenship tends to define citizenship as rights-based, that is, citizenship means political membership by means of which one is entitled to certain civic, social, and political rights. This paper aims to explore the meaning of citizenship in a changing world while focusing on the affective dimension of citizenship, or citizenship as the emotional experience of a collective bond. Drawing on anthropological, philosophical and theological research, the paper conceptualizes of affective dimension of citizenship by referring to the disposition that individuals develop on account of shared group practices. The paper argues that, if the affective dimension of citizenship is taken into account, then the potential for re-modeling of citizenship in a post-national world is on the local level more so than on the transnational or global level. The paper explores some of the conceptual problems that the local development of citizenship runs into such as the question of whether or not the local development of affective bonds feeds into bonds between citizens on a larger scale. The underpinnings of the paper are that human beings flourish in communities that facilitate affective bonding between its members and that any kind of 'thick' ideal of citizenship necessarily takes the affective dimension into account.

7. From Social Practices to Reflective agency: a postsecular ethics of citizenship

AUTHOR:

Paolo Monti earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy in 2005, with a focus on issues of normative ethics and public ethics in contemporary American philosophy, with special reference to the work of Robert Audi. He served as visiting researcher at Notre Dame University in 2004 and 2006, working on issues related to moral epistemology, ethical intuitionism and the relationship between religion pluralism and public discourse. He was also visiting researcher in the Department of Bioethics of the NIH in 2009 on issues related to public deliberation and ethics of the healthcare systems, and at Georgetown University in 2011 researching on paradigms of public reason and democratic institutions. He worked from 2007 to 2010 at the Center for Clinical Bioethics and Healthcare Governance at Fondazione IRCCS Ospedale Maggiore Policlinico, a public research hospital based in Milan, on projects concerning public deliberation in healthcare, informed consent and patients' empowerment. From 2011 to 2013 he served as research fellow at ASSET – Studium Generale Marcianum, Venice, with an interdisciplinary project on public reason in plural societies. He is currently Lecturer at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan.

ABSTRACT:

As active members of society - workers, activists, consumers, players, etc. - we constantly participate in a number of social practices and these practices come with sets of embedded



beliefs, rules, habits and values. Our participation in this web of evolving and often interconnected practices places us within a texture of diffused social cooperation that constitutes the body of civil society. It is primarily in this fashion that by inhabiting within a certain public space with our beliefs, religious and secular alike, that we happen to be implicated with others and their own beliefs. Under conditions of pluralism, one's own cooperative practices are shaped by the presence of different co-practitioners, because one's co-practitioners are believers on their own, with a specific self-understanding about the relationship between their beliefs and their social agency. The wide debate over the notion of postsecularism has provided a substantial contribution to the understanding of religious pluralism in contexts of late secularization, precisely thanks to its focus on how the self-understanding of religious and secular actors is affected by their co-implication within the same discursive space. This transformative relationship mutually binds the diverse self-understandings that the social actors bring into the public sphere. Within this framework, I suggest that a normative ethics of citizenship arises from a reflective consideration of the web of practical cooperative relationships that ordinarily characterize our agency as actors of civil society. Everyone is dependent on social cooperation and is in some way responsible for it but, at the same time, nobody owns entirely its constitutive cognitive and motivational resources. This reflective awareness points towards an epistemic and practical disposition to cooperatively re-arrange and re-formulate one's own arguments and actions in the light of the structural co-implication of one's own belief with the beliefs of others within the same public space. Denying this structural co-implication performatively contradicts the resources of one's own self-understanding as a believer who inhabits a public sphere, since those resources are always to some extent of cooperative nature.



Proposed Schedule:

Friday May 30th

- 9:30 Registration
10:00 Introductory Remarks by **David Thunder**
10:15 *Presentation 1: Simon Keller* – “What is it like to be a good citizen? Civic motivation in the 21st century”
11:00 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 1
11:15 Open Q & A
11:45 COFFEE BREAK
12:15 *Presentation 2: Ryan Davis* – “Autonomy and the Attitude of Toleration”
13:00 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 2
13:15 Open Q & A
13:45 LUNCH
15:45 *Presentation 3: Emma Cohen* – “Conscientious Citizenship: A Philosophical Examination of Conscience Claims in the Public Sphere”

16:30 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 3
16:45 Open Q & A
17:15 COFFEE BREAK
17:30 *Presentation 4: Bill English* – “Varieties of Citizenship and the Moral Foundations of Politics”
18:15 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 4
18:30 Open Q & A
19:00 End Presentations
20:30 Meet at hotel for drinks
21:00 Dinner at hotel

Saturday May 31st

- 10:00 *Presentation 5: Angela Miceli* – “Conscientious Citizenship: A Philosophical Examination of Conscience Claims in the Public Sphere”
10:45 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 5
11:00 Open Q & A
11:30 COFFEE BREAK
12:00 *Presentation 6: Paolo Monti* – “From Social Practices to Reflective agency: a postsecular ethics of citizenship”
12:45 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 6
13:00 Open Q & A
13:30 LUNCH
15:30 *Presentation 7: David Thunder* – “Freedom, the Burden of Justice, and the Limits of Rules: A Challenge to Law-Based Approaches to Justice”
16:15 Discussant Remarks on Presentation 7
16:30 Open Q & A



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- 17:00 FREE TIME
- 20:00 Meet at hotel for drinks
- 20:30 Dinner at hotel