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Back 2013_12_09_ICS_A propósito de juicios y castigos

Ana Marta González, ICS Researcher and Professor of Moral Philosophy

On Judgments and Punishments

lun, 09 dic 2013 19:14:00 +0000 Publicado en La Gaceta de los Negocios

The disturbing regularity with which some judicial processes have been at the center of media attention during the last few months (the case Bárcenas, Noos, ERES of Andalusia, etc…) is an invitation to not only think about the state of health of our rule of law but also on the moral foundations of justice.

"The criminal has the right to be punished". In this way, Hegel is able to communicate two important ideas: the law is not a question of whim nor is the punishment a question of revenge. Indeed, referring to punishment as a criminal's "right" is a way of recognizing the criminal's necessary freedom for commiting a crime. From this standpoint, the punishment represents an opportunity to reestablish –as a person- the moral dignity that the criminal himself has lost when committing his crime. The punishment alone does not return the moral dignity to those who have lost it, unless it is preceded by repentance, whereby the offender distances himself personally from the crime he has committed, reproaching his past action and attempting to make the necessary amends, thereby clearly establishing the difference between a person and his action...

This point of view regarding punishment, without being incompatible with that which considers it in educational or preventive terms, puts emphasis on another aspect, disfigured in our strategic- emotional culture: the notion of moral dignity; the idea that maybe our behavior cannot live up to our condition as rational beings; the  idea that being rational is more than being singularly complex animals, and behaving rationally is more than being able to strategically satisfy interests and desires, not unlike those that could ultimately move any other animal. Then, more radically, to be rational is a title for a particular dignity, defined by the possibility of opening up oneself to a different universe of ethical reasons that close off any purely instrumental consideration of the human being.Plato was moving within this universe of thought when, five centuries before Christ, in his dialogue called Gorgias, Socrates was heard saying that famous phrase: "it´s better to suffer injustice than to do an injustice". The laughter with which the interlocutor of Socrates received these words can be compared with the condescending smile of those who are inclined to think that real life transpires according to very different categories.

But this is precisely where the philosophical audacity of Plato lies: questioning the theses consecrated by the dominant moral mediocrity and clearly asserting, against deceptive appearances, "that it is more essential to guard against committing an injustice than to suffering it, and that most of all, special care should be taken so as not to appear to be good, but rather to actually be good, in private and in public. If anyone becomes bad in some way, he should be punished, and this is the second good, after that of being fair, meaning the return to being good and expiating the blame through the punishment".
To read Plato in our social and cultural context is subversive. It gives us the opportunity to regret that Philosophy has almost disappeared from high school curriculum, being replaced by what is considered to be more useful and productive knowledge. It would be a mistake to think that religion classes can fill this gap. The European identity, currently reduced to economic issues, has been forged in the heat of dialogue, agreements and disagreements, between reason and faith. Waiving any of these extremes weakens the core of that which has nourished our convictions during centuries because it cuts off the root that feeds them. In fact, the lack of convictions is the most dangerous thing for the present and future vitality of Europe. Without this perception, the deterioration of the citizens' confidence in political and legal institutions occurs, institutions whose credibility urgently needs to be strengthened.

It is possible that following the news and information regarding judicial processes that are now underway in our country, more than one philosophical soul may have recalled the lesson that Socrates pointed out from the myth with which Plato ends Gorgias, where a reference is made to the existence of a law prevailing since the times of Chrono; the judicial proceedings which followed this law when deciding the fate of men  -Islands of the Blessed o the prison for expiation and punishment, called Tartarus–  took place during the life of those accused. This led to many imperfections in the court proceedings because the men went to be judged "covered with beautiful bodies, with nobility and with riches, and…presenting numerous witnesses that testified that they had led righteous lives". Therefore, Zeus dictated that the judicial proceedings take place after death, in order to observe the naked souls, without any ornaments, and with only the wounds of their crimes being visible, thereby avoiding the possibility of the judges being seduced by appearances.