Foreign military presence
France
During decades only France, the colonial metropolis, had military bases in the country in exchange for financial aid and military defense. France ruled the country until June 27, 1977, when the French Somaliland (Djibouti) became independent. In 1957, the Base Aérienne 188 or ‘Camp de l’Unité,’ commonly known as the naval base of Héron, was established as one of France’s largest military bases abroad. While France has kept a strong trade relationshhip with Sub-Saharan African countries, who in 2016 accounted for over 80% of France’s $8.5 billion in imports, basicaly centered on commodities, it has significantly reduced its military presence: in the case of Djibouti, France has downsized its forces from 4,000 troops in 1977 to 1,450 in 2021. The French were also Djibouti’s major donor until 2010 when China overtook Paris as the heaviest investor.
Japan
Alongside the contribution to the modernization of the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, Tokyo invested $30 million plus aid in its Self-Defense Force Base in the country. Erected in 2011, this facility is Japan’s first full-scale, long-term overseas base since World War II. It was established with the objective of protecting commercial vessels from piracy and for intelligence-gathering purposes although, during a visit to Djibouti in August 2016, former Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada declared that Japan was considering expanding the scope of operations at the base. Following this statement, Tokyo confirmed its intention to expand the size of the base to 15 hectares and build facilities capable of providing accommodation for Japanese nationals in times of emergency. In 2017, the base hosted evacuation operations exercises as part of these efforts. Japan’s decision to broaden the role and size of its base in Djibouti is seen as a strategic move to counterweight China’s growing influence in Africa.
Moreover, a partnership between Washington and Tokyo launched the Official Development Assistance, a program of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to strategically negotiate with the Djibouti government and secure the backing of the local population; it is mainly focused on diplomatic and economic aims.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Saudi bases in Djibouti are essential in the pan-regional confrontation of Iran, one of whose most important ramifications is the Yemen proxy war, as the Iranian government funds the Houthis.The ties between Djibouti and the Gulf States go beyond security and commercial schemes, with Djibouti being part of the Arab League, bound to them by culture and religion. Djibouti materialized its support to Saudi Arabia by rejecting a Russian prospect of building a base in its territory, out of fear that accepting the request of Russia, an ally and supplier of Iran, would jeopardize Djibouti’s pact with the second-largest oil producer in the world.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia channels its influence over the government in Djibouti through the “World Assembly of Muslim Youth” (WAMY), the primary global preacher of the Kingdom’s preferred interpretation of Islam. Even though one of organization’s main aims is to “introduce Islam to non-Muslims in its purest form as a comprehensive system and way of life”, this is an entity comprised of individuals holding government positions who wield significant leverage over both domestic and foreign affairs in Saudi Arabia. WAMY actively participates in the administration of Guelleh and provides funding for community initiatives in the country. Hence, WAMY is accountable for preserving Saudi Arabia’s interests in Djibouti, rather than focusing on spreading religious doctrine.
Furthermore, Djibouti’s main commercial port was under construction by the UAE corporation DP World, who already manage eight ports in African countries. Nonetheless, the construction was suspended in 2018 due to a controversy with the government. Following this, a Chinese company was awarded with the tender. Consequently, as a strategic move, the UAE built a military port on the opposite side of the Red Sea, in Assab, Eritrea. In addition, the UAE is at the forefront of port development in Aden and Socotra Island on the coast of Yemen and Berbera in Somaliland, and Bossaso in Puntland. For GCC states, East African countries such as Djibouti and Eritrea are of strategic value as they are access points to Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
United States
In 2002, Djibouti became home to the only permanent US military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier. Merely three months following the 9/11 attacks, the US facility was established in the area due to the recognition of its strategic position and the presence of Al Qaeda in Yemen and the HoA. This location would serve as a crucial starting point for President Bush’s Global War on Terror. Djibouti has served as the Pakistan of East Africa, playing a pivotal role in the United States military campaign against jihadists in the region. In addition, the US aims to secure its energy security interests by safeguarding access to oil and gas reserves in the Middle East and the HoA.
This military installation, which reportedly pays an annual rent of $70 million, serves as the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, with approximately 4,000 military personnel stationed there. This command plays a crucial role in conducting covert and counterterrorism operations in Somalia, Yemen, and other places of the continent to promote regional stability, prevent conflict, and safeguard US and coalition interests.
In May 2014, the Somalia-based Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab carried out a terrorist attack in Djibouti, marking the first such incident in decades. Al-Shabaab claimed that Djibouti had become a “military base from which every war against Muslims in East Africa is planned and executed.” In response, Washington conducted approximately 200 operations from its military base in Djibouti between 2017 and 2018. Thus, Djibouti faced the risk of retaliation, as hosting US military personnel may be perceived as complicity.
After the escalation of the Ethiopian civil war in 2021, the US military also proposed an attack deployed from the American base in Djibouti, but the Guelleh administration publicly stated that was not feasible. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the Djibouti government has any authority over military operations planned by foreign powers on its territory. To address this, President Guelleh engages in multilateral diplomatic coalitions, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African regional organization, to try to project an image of order and balance of power.
Besides this, the close proximity of the Chinese military base to the US Camp Lemonnier, combined with Beijing’s control over the port of Doraleh, has led to higher tensions between the two rival superpowers. These developments have even raised fears that the United States may be forced to withdraw its base from Djibouti. The situation has been exacerbated since 2018 by allegations that Chinese personnel have used laser beams to target and blindfold US pilots, an accusation China has denied.
People’s Republic of China (PRC)
In 2015, Djibouti recognized that its national sovereignty was at risk due to the excessive power it had conceded to a single foreign power, the United States, which maintained a military base on its territory. As a result, Djibouti city ceded part of its territory to China, which pledged to increase financial investments in the country through its Belt and Road Initiative. Accordingly, in 2017, the two countries announced the formation of a “strategic partnership,” leading to the establishment of the People’s Liberation Army’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, situated just six miles from the US base. The Chinese base has the capacity to host up to 10,000 troops, although only an estimated 250 are currently stationed there. Its main objectives are to protect merchant ships and safeguard Beijing’s national security interests. The PRC’s military base is abnormally large and protected with razor-wire fences, raising concerns in Washington and Tokyo about the ulterior motives behind such facilities. Approximately one million Chinese people have emigrated to Djibouti to work for the many Chinese-owned businesses.
Alongside the government’s authorization to settle in the country, the Chinese have undertaken initiatives to win support from the local population, such as the construction of the $580 million Doraleh Multipurpose Port, and the $4 billion Addis-Ababa-Djibouti railway, the first modern electrified railway line in East Africa, which alleviates Ethiopia’s heavy reliance on Djibouti for trade. As a landlocked country, it depends on the small nation for 90% of its formal trade. Beijing is also currently building the largest International Free Trade Zone(FTZ) in Africa in Djibouti, which is anticipated to be completed before 2035 with an estimated investment of $3.5 billion. Three Chinese companies are involved in the FTZ, alongside Djibouti’s port authority.
On top of that, for African diplomats, Sino-African relations are more proactive and refreshing than relations with European nations. According to former Senegalese Head of State Abdoulaye Wade, China’s attitude to African needs is more proactive than the “slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors.” As a result, African states welcome Chinese foreign presence and investment as it symbolizes a new economic horizon for many small African states, now able to exploit their natural resources and engage in commerce with the PRC industrial sector. To exemplify, since 2009 Beijing has been Africa’s largest trading partner, representing around 15% of the region’s overall trade. Thereupon, the US military is currently investigating alternative locations for establishing a drone station in West Africa. Secretary Blinken’s trip to the West African coast in January 2024 likely focused on this matter, as he held meetings with leaders from Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Angola.
Notwithstanding, Djibouti’s public external debt is estimated to have increased considerably, from 35% of GDP in 2013 to 75% by the end of 2020, according to the IMF, with much of this debt stemming from Chinese loans. In 2018 Djibouti owed at least $1.2 billion to China, about 40% of its GDP. This situation has prompted concerns among the international community regarding the increasing leverage Beijing could use, not only in Djibouti but throughout the region, as the debt continues to accumulate.
Chinese companies have built about 100 African ports, and some of them are operate by Chinese shippers. However, criticism against China is debated in mature media networks. Nonetheless, Djibouti does not possess robust, independent, and developed media networks able to criticize the government. In any case, the PRC is currently confronted with an Africa that is becoming more assertive and multipolar, which is compelling foreign powers to define their security interests in terms of who and from whom they protect. China will probably persist in its efforts to secure buy-ins in order to safeguard or advance its interests. But it will remain as reliant on local politics and the specific relationships that accompany them as it has always been.
Others
Italy established in 2013 the National Support Military Base (Base Militare Nazionale di Supporto ‘Amedeo Guillet’), which hosts 300 active personnel and serves anti-piracy purposes. Moreover, Germany (temporarily) and Spain (permanently) have stationed their military troops in the French base of Héron in Djibouti to protect their merchant ships from terrorist threats. These forces have also participated in European Union missions, such as Operation Atalanta and Operation Enduring Freedom.
South Korea also utilizes Djibouti commercial port to launch their naval operatives in the region and India has an agreement allowing it to operate on American, French, and Japanese bases in the country. Even Russia has expressed interest in constructing naval bases in Djibouti; however, it has been unsuccessful in its efforts and those talks have stalled. Moscow does not explicitly compete with the United States or China in the region, but it has expanded its presence in the region as a provider of private security and an arms supplier.
Current situation and conclusion
Non-elite segments of the population have largely been excluded from the benefits of this approach. Relatives of the president hold key posts in the ports and logistics industry, which accounts for 46.6% of Djibouti’s economy. The sentiment throughout Africa about the establishment of further foreign outposts is becoming increasingly ambiguous. In 2016, the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a decision advising countries to exercise caution when allowing the establishment of additional foreign military facilities. This stance has become even more firm due to the unstable geopolitical situation in certain locations of the region.
Djibouti’s geopolitical importance has been heightened by various factors, but the recent assaults by Houthi insurgents on merchant vessels in the Red Sea, along with a resurgence of piracy targeting ships near Somalia, underscore the relevance of Djibouti in safeguarding vital sea routes like the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to ensure uninterrupted maritime navigation. Additionally, the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict has increased foreign powers’ interest in the Horn of Africa due to its access to the Red Sea between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
In the past, African governments have acquired political capital by hosting military bases, although the efficacy of this strategy in stimulating economic activity has varied. National legitimacy and regime survival have been significantly influenced by engagement with major powers. However, hosting military bases involves the risk of the host country, in this case, Djibouti, being considered complicit in foreign powers’ military actions, such as the Yemen civil war due to the presence of Saudi bases in its territory. Djibouti is then considered a playgroundof the major powers, applying a cunning strategy to profit from their geopolitical position.
