EU tank standardization: Current situation and future. Success or a bridge too far?

The War in Ukraine brought the tank back into the spotlight of modern warfare. Conflicts in the Middle East and the annexation of Crimea had led many to put the focus on unconventional warfare and grey zone tactics. In addition, it sent shockwaves throughout the European defense apparatus, with the EU’s nascent security tools slowly moving to respond to the new challenges. One of their major realizarions was the need to adquire an adecuate number of capable MBTs to defend themselves. Furthermore, the EU countries realized the need to unify their efforts to create a capable defense industry.  As a consequence, Europe has initiated efforts to unify the defense market by reducing the number of different MBT models, which complicated military cooperation.

The question remains, however… Will Europe manage to create a standard MBT, or will the project end in failure? What challenges will Europe face at the technological and political level? The article will analyze the current situation of European MBTs, the process being carried out to create a common MBT, and the challenges it will face. It will conclude by summarizing the findings of the investigation.

Current Situation

Europe has traditionally been the focus of the development of armored warfare since its inception in World War I, peaking during World War II. Some of the most iconic tanks in history were created with the focus on a major war in Europe or influenced by combat experiences in the continent. The current composition of armored vehicles of Europe is no different; finding their roots in a Cold War era focused on a possible war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Within NATO, the inventory of MBTs is hardly homogeneous. It includes leftover tanks of the old Soviet Block in limited service with the militaries of the former Warsaw Pact or Yugoslavia and old American and French models to a lesser extent. For example, Poland and Croatia operate the Russian T-72 together with a limited number of domestically produced models of this MBT like the PT-91 “Twardy” and the Yugoslavian M-84. In fact, Poland is the country with the most diverse collection of tanks in service; besides the T-72—both in the Soviet and the Polish versions—, the country also has in service an assortment of MBTs produced in different countries like the US M-1 “Abrams”, the south Korean K- 2 “Black Panther”, or the German “Leopard” 2 in different versions.

Some Western European nations like Britain, France, and Italy have created their own tank models and operate, respectively, the “Challenger” 2/3, the ”Leclerc”, and the “Ariete” MBTs. Meanwhile, countries like Greece and Portugal continue to field American vintage tanks like the M-48 “Patton” and the M-60.

The most common tank in use by European nations, however, is the German built “Leopard” 2, used not only by Germany, but also by countries like Hungary, Spain—which manufactures it under license—, Austria, Norway, Sweden, and other NATO and EU members. The ”Leopard” is currently considered as one of the best tanks in the world, alongside the British “Challenger” 2 and the US M-1 A2 “Abrams”. Currently, its producer, Rheinmetall, is developing a new MBT, the ”Panther” KF51, based on the chassis of its predecessor, the “Leopard” 2.

This diversity of armored vehicles has become a contentious issue, as Europe, and specially NATO seek to achieve some level of standardization of the many militaries of the Alliance. The co-existence of multiple models complicates the interoperability of European militaries not sharing the same type of MBT, and hobbles the possibility of potential customers benefitting from the economy of scale that a limited number of MBTs would enable.

NATO is not the only one concerned with Russia; with the establishment of a common European Defense Fund and the CSDP, the EU took on a more military approach. The limitations in defense in Europe alarmed the leaders of both organizations, as they awoke to the reality of their severe shortcomings in this field after decades of neglect in budgets.

NATO attempted to mitigate the problem by increasing interoperability through the harmonization of the ammunition used by its members, while renewing calls to reach the minimum 2% of GDP in defense spending the Alliance demands of its members since the Wales Summit in 2014. The EU, for its part, focused on launching standardization programs under the European Defence Agency (EDA). These efforts, however, proved to be only stopgaps, as Europe failed to catch up to Moscow’s capabilities despite concerns from U.S. presidents for the European allies to increase defense spending in light of the changing geopolitical landscape in the continent as in the Indo-Pacific, where, especially Russia and China, respectively, emerged as systemic rivals of the Alliance.

Many of the above mentioned vehicles have seen some degree of combat with the Ukrainian military as part of the military aid the West lent Kyiv in response to the 2022 invasion. This has created a new challenge for NATO, since the presence of such powerful tanks in the theater not only increases tensions with Russia, but also increases risks of the tanks and their strengths and weakness being compromised to a hostile actor.

Rather than developing new tank models, European defense authorities focused on improving their already existing ones, with the modernization of the ”Leopard” 2, the ”Leclerc” , and the ”Ariete” being the focus, in an approach similar to that of the US after failure to create a replacement for the M-1 “Abrams”. However, the idea of developing a new generation of MBTs was also considered. Advances in technology have marked major revolutions in tank warfare, including the use of drones, together with concerns over the use of AI in warfare, that have increased the urgency of the need of a new-generation MBT and the systems necessary to maintain them.

Furthermore, Western aid to Ukraine has created another problem that spurs innovation; as the war continues and more military hardware keeps being sent to the frontline, the number of tanks and weapons fielded by NATO decreases, reducing the Alliance’s defensive capabilities. This not only includes tanks in storage but also weapons in active service of NATO members, alongside the ammunition that can be used by the allies. In addition, tanks like the “Abrams”, which dominated the battlefield in the 1990s and early 2000s are starting to show their weakness and old age in battlefields when facing more modern enemies like the tanks and anti-tank weapons being used in Ukraine by the Russian military.

A common MBT

The current strategic environment, and the reinvigorated support of most European states to a common security has created a new opportunity to further increase the interoperability of the EU militaries. Evidence of the renewed importance of the tank in this endeavor is Ukrainian President Zelensky’s requests through 2023 and 2024 for “Leopard” tanks and offensive weapons, and the heavy tank losses in the war. Furthermore, Eurosatory 2022 and 2024 have shown a renewed interest in MBTs as KNDS and Rheinmetall’s prototype tanks were the protagonists of the exhibition. Weapons and systems used in tanks were also a highlight, with more powerful cannons.

There are several projects within the EU to move forward in the development of a single European MBT. The most significant ones are the “Main Armored Tank of Europe” (MARTE), and the “Technologies for a Future MBT” (FMBTech), both projects being founded by the EDF since 2024. The former program is led by the MARTE ARGE GbR consortium that brings together German, Italian, Sweed, Estonian, Lithuanian, Spanish, Belgian, Norwegian, Greek, Romanian, Finnish, and Dutch companies to create a new MBT platform that integrates innovative and disruptive technologies to counter current and future threats.

The latter’s aims is to enable existing and future European MBTs to achieve the highest possible operational and combat effectiveness. The project will aim to define specific innovative technologies for an MBT system. The main emphasis of the project will be digital capabilities, including interactions with robotic systems, and the integration of AI. Although, not a member of MARTE, France participates in the FMBTech program.

In parallel to MARTE, France and Germany had launched in 2017 the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) with the objective of replacing their current MBTs. On April 2024, both countries formalized talks to jointly develop a Main Battle Tank (MBT) to replace the “Leopard” 2 and ”Leclerc”  MBTs by 2040. The project falls in line under proposals by EU members in regard to the EDA and CSDP’s concern of Russia, reignited after the annexation of Crimea and intensified after the 2022 invasion. It was close to being scrapped after rumors that Germany was considering abandoning it to join Sweeden, Italy, and Spain in a different project.

Germany’s Rheinmetall “Panther” KF51 is considered by some defense analysts as the first step or at least a testing ground to the MGCS and a future European MBT. It is clear from the design of the “Panther”, that the “Leopard” 2 will play a key role in its development, from which it has been greatly influenced. France and Germany, two of Europe’s largest industries, have shown consensus after almost ten years of negotiations to finally decide to build a common MBT, and are the architects of the program.

A fourth project is also in development in Europe. In October 2024, Italy’s Leonardo agreed with Rheinmetall to cooperate in developing a new MBT, separated from the two aforementioned programs. The move has been hailed as a major step, since it involves two of the strongest defense companies in Europe. The goal of the program is for Rheinmetall to provide “Panther” KF51s to the Italian Army to replace their “Ariete” tanks. Furthermore, other Italian companies have also agreed to contribute to the program.

Outside of the EU, the United kingdom unveiled the ”Challenger” 3 as a replacement to its vaunted “Challenger” 2. The “Challenger” 3, which is being jointly developed between the UK’s BAE and Germany’s Rheinmetall, benefits from being an upgraded version of the “Challenger” 2.

Challenges

Despite the consensus and willingness to go forward with the program at the political level, the success of the MGCS project is still in question. Previous attempts to create a joint tank offer a bleak picture. Such is the case of the MBT-70, an attempt in the 1960s by the United States and West Germany to create a common, cost-effective, efficient MBT that could counter the newer models the Warsaw Pact started to field at that time, and that could become a standard tank for NATO. The experience of Israeli tankers in the Yom Kippur War added urgency to replace the older tanks being fielded by the US, which soon had to overcome major problems. Costs quickly increased more than any of those involved was willing to invest, and alongside, diverging priorities in the project, design disagreements, and the use of untested new technologies led West Germany to abandon the project and to pursue the creation of the “Leopard” 2. The US Congress followed suit, pulling the plug on the project, leading to the development of the full-American M1 “Abrams”. The problems faced with the MBT-70 will likely be seen by the MARTE and MGCS programs.

Interoperability will be another challenge for the Europeanm MBT. Despite the goal of creating a single tank model, at this time there are at a minimum three projects, one between Germany and Italy aimed to replace the “Ariete”, the MGCS between Germany and France, and the MARTE program that contains the rest of Europe. It must be remembered that these tanks will need to be able to operate alongside the American and British models used by their Atlantic Allies.  

Rheinmetall seems to have taken precautions influenced by the failed MBT-70 experience. It is now focusing on the development of the “Panther” MBT with the intent of selling it to nations already fielding the “Leopard” 2, if only because the prototypes of the “Panther” show a chassis and turret based on the “Leopard” 2, thus making it easier for nations operating this model to retrain their units into the new “Panther”.

It is not clear what the designs of the MGCS or MARTE will be, whether the “Panther” is called to become the future European tank, or if it is just a stepping stone meant to acquire data for the development of the actual EMBT, or if Germany will definitely abandon the MGCS to favor the MARTE project. It is also unclear how said moves might affect Italy’s plans to adqurire the KF51s. Many prototypes are being considered, with some even considering UGVs or more powerful guns. There are many disagreements between the many companies involved in the development of the MBT, with different approaches as to how to apply lessons from the war in Ukraine.

In the meantime, Europe is attempting to close the technological gap by modernizing the MBTs at its disposal, particularly in its communications equipment and systems. It is worth noting that the “Panther” is not expected to enter into service until the 2030s at earliest and enter full service in the 2040s. Furthermore, the new tanks are also expected to have a service life of thirty years. It must also be remembered that the production of tanks will take time and so, many armored units are likely to continue fielding the “Leopard” or their already existing tanks until they are gradually replaced with the newer vehicles.

Experience shows that the issue of technology will likely be the most sensitive one in the project. The MBT-70, for example, incorporated a new type of suspension and new weapons like anti-tank missiles, systems all of them far less advanced than those in use today but revolutionary at the time, which created their own sets of problems. One of its sequels, the M-1 “Abrams”, was fast and had effective armor and firepower, but at a cost, however, in weight and fuel consumption, and bringing challenges in transportation and maintenance. The MGCS projects are making it clear that they will incorporate new technologies including AI, drones, and new targeting systems, that may pose similar challenges.

It must be remembered that the technologies incorporated may look perfect on paper, but in reality, may be hard to use or even impossible to put into action. It is for this reason that the main European tank builders are also focusing on modernization of the existing models, since the estimated date for the fielding of new generation tanks is fluid and could very well go beyond the expected 2030.

It is at the moment not known how the new technologies will work in the field, as the U.S. Army experienced during the war in Iraq, in which several “Abrams” were lost after the tank’s systems meant to prevent fires or the detonation of ammunition caused the vehicles to shut down in the middle of combat zones, especially on the road to Baghdad and the two subsequent “Thunder Runs” into the city.

There are also disagreements between the members of the MGCS and the MARTE programs in regard to the technologies in the new tanks and their designs. Despite plans to use the same development and planning system they used to create the Eurofighter, it will be of little use if the basic requirements are not ironed out. The basics of tank design, such as the caliber of the main gun or the weight of the vehicle are not clearly laid out by the members of the two competing programs, complicating the creation of a working and effective MBT. Furthermore, there is still no consensus on which of the characteristics of the tank will they decide to put their focus on.

Furthermore, it is not clear how will Europe maneuver sales of the new MBT to actors outside of Europe or nations not involved in the program. Concerns over the highly advanced and sensitive technology contained in current MBTs and weapons systems make nations cautious on where to deploy them and to who it may be issued. This will be harder as it will be a consortium of different nations and not a single actor negotiating with both the buyer and Brussels.

The War in Ukraine has brought this fact to the forefront, with concerns at the higher levels of Western governments over sending ”Abrams”  or “Leopards” to Kiev lest the tanks are destroyed and their remains analyzed by adversaries. An even worse scenario may materialize if the vehicles are captured intact or semi-intact by an adversary, because it may compromise the safety of Western soldiers elsewhere, and because the hostile force capturing them might be able to use the tanks against it.

As mentioned before, the issue of coordinating the projects will prove challenging, even if the EDA offers some framework, as will be that of the ammunition it must be able to deliver, as European nations seek to develop new types of ammunition  to counter a new generation of tanks.

Another major issue will be that of the competition European states will enter into over the contracts and their share of the projects. Italy attempted to join the MSGC when the initiative was launched but was denied access by Germany and France, who wanted to keep the project a bilateral affair until a prototype could be created. From an economic perspective, it is not clear how the consortium of European nations will handle the issues of sales of weapons. Political concerns and discrepancies are likely to be a major obstacle.

Finally, an additional significant point of contention is who will manufacture the tanks. This is a particularly sensitive issue, as the creation of a single tank will likely cause a loss of jobs in the industrial states not awarded with the project, while those producing them will reap huge economic benefits. This problem is likely to be more visible in the MARTE, as it involves a much larger number of nations and companies, each with their own products and interests.

Conclusion

As it is now, either Europe will have to extensively negotiate to decide on specifications and responsibilities, or the project will fail, ending up with European countries fielding a plethora of diverse, albeit technologically similar MBTs. While said programs will undoubtedly increase the European defense industry, they will also mark the failure of the initial goal of creating a unified European MBT.

While some of the challenges faced by the MBT-70 have been somewhat addressed by the EU’s political system, the practical problems of developing a multinational project like the EMBT still remain. Only time will tell if the MGCS, MARTE, and the Italo-German programs will succeed in creating an effective MBT or not. The project is only at its political level; it remains to be seen if it will become a reality and how Europe will face the challenges that accompany it.

If the projects succeed, however, they will mark a major development in European defense industries and the defense landscape of both, the EU and NATO. The introduction of new MBTs, with the lessons of the war in Ukraine in mind, are likely to influence armored warfare tactics for years.

What we can be certain is the fact that, wether the programs are a successful or not, they will leave the participants with invaluable experience and lessons that may be applied in future European defense projects not limited to MBTs and armored vehicles.