In the image
Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, before the war started [Ferdinand Reus]
Saudi Arabia is trying to extricate itself from the Yemeni civil war in which it has intervened since 2014. The Saudi-led coalition’s poor military results, which have projected an image of weakness, have given the Saudi leadership cause for concern. The current outbreak of violence in the Middle East, in the context of the Hamas-Israel conflict, is hindering the negotiations which, in September 2023, seemed close to a breakthrough. Current backchannel talks between the Saudis and the Houthis indicate that Saudi Arabia would rather end the conflict than achieve its original goals of eliminating an Iranian ally on its border.
Following the 2011 Arab Spring, political instability has been a feature of Yemeni politics, when protests against President Abdullah Saleh’s regime erupted. Saleh, a repressive dictator who had ruled the country from 1990 onwards, was overthrown in 2012 and replaced by the Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi’s democratically-elected government. In 2014, owing to high oil prices and youth discontent, the Houthis led an insurgency against the central government and reached Sanaa, the capital. The rapid advance of the Houthis, a Shiite insurgency, was a cause for alarm for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which feared having an Iranian proxy with a penchant for terrorism within missile-strike distance of its oil facilities. After reaching Sanaa, the Houthis ousted the governmental forces. In this context, the President asked for military assistance, and Saudi Arabia, alongside the United Arab Emirates (UAE), led a coalition to aid the internationally recognised government defeat the Houthis militarily.
The fight against terrorism: The Houthis, the Islamic State, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
The original appeal made by President Hadi to the GCC discussed stabilising the region and avoiding the spread of terrorism. The context within which the intervention was conducted was a heightened state of alert as a result of the spread of Islamic terrorism worldwide, which was exacerbated by the presence of groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State (ISIS) in Yemen. In his letter appealing for the help of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Omar, Kuwait, and Qatar, Hadi identified the Houthis as aggressors, but also explicitly stated that Al-Qaeda and ISIS would “exploit” the instability resulting from the coup to provoke further conflict. From the very beginning of the intervention, opposition to the Houthis, which originally constituted a threat to national unity, was presented as linked to the fight against transnational terrorism.
However, the civil war presented all terrorists groups operating in Yemen—including the Houthis, AQAP, and ISIS—with an opportunity, with allegations that the civilian suffering caused by the civil war was radicalising more people to join terrorist ranks. Even though there were sustained strikes against both the Houthis and AQAP, both of these groups remain active players in the country and continue to pose a threat. Since 2015, when Iran aided the Houthis in acquiring anti-ship missiles, the Houthi missile arsenal has significantly expanded reaching its current form, with which it threatens international shipping through the Bab-al-Mandab strait.
The strategic imperatives behind the intervention
The strategic imperative behind the intervention, beyond the official reasons of stabilising the region and avoiding the spread of terrorism, was Yemen’s location in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen grants access to the Bab-al-Mandab Strait, which at its narrowest point is 26 kilometres wide. This means that, at any point in time, only two ships can pass simultaneously, constituting a chokepoint through which global shipping transits. This is of special importance for GCC countries, and large oil and natural gas exporters because approximately 4.8 million barrels of oil and refined petroleum flowed daily through the strait in 2016.
Additionally, the Houthis’ reaching power would have been a strategic setback for Saudi Arabia, as the clan is closely affiliated with Iran, its greatest regional rival. The Houthis’ political alignment with Iran, which proclaims the need for exporting its Islamic Revolution elsewhere, would add momentum to anti-government protests in the region, and prove that governments could be overthrown by force. A complete Houthi takeover of Yemen would have further constituted a catalyst for other unhappy minorities, a special cause of concern for Saudi Arabia, which had seen violent protests in its Shia-majority (and oil-rich) Eastern province between 2012 and 2013. With the recent protests still in mind and alleging that all anti-government protests were directed by Iran, it was in Saudi Arabia’s interest to ensure the survival of the Sunni-led government in Yemen.
Saudi attempts at exit
The Saudi government, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has been attempting to extricate itself from the Yemen civil war. The mass bombing campaigns conducted on Yemen and the humanitarian crisis caused by the civil war have tarnished Saudi Arabia’s international image. Additionally, the Saudi-led coalition’s poor military results, in spite of its access to some of the most advanced American equipment, and one of the largest military budgets in the world, have given the Saudi leadership cause for concern. Not only has the failed military intervention led to allegations of war crimes, but it has also projected an image of weakness. After all, a well-funded coalition has been unable to defeat a small insurgency employing asymmetric means of warfare, demonstrating that Saudi Arabia has neither the military capabilities nor the will to fight in a manner expected of a regional power. Consequently, it is no wonder that the leadership began talks with Houthi representatives in March 2023, following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Houthi’s main backers.
Close to a breakthrough?
Owing to Houthi disruption of international trade flowing through the Bab-al-Mandab Strait, and according to the Houthis part of a demonstration of solidarity with Hamas, the Houthis have become international pariahs in the eyes of some of Saudi Arabia’s closest backers. The current outbreak of violence in the Middle East is hindering the negotiations which, in September 2023, seemed close to a breakthrough. Indeed, the United Nations Special Representative for Yemen warned in March 2024 that, with the global relevance of Yemen, parties to the conflict were likely to modify their calculations and negotiation agendas.
Nonetheless, the domestic political incentives for Saudi exit, mostly the exorbitant cost of military intervention and the distraction from other goals, such as Saudi Vision 2030, remain. This means that Saudi Arabia will likely return to the negotiating table in the near future. Indeed, Saudi may attempt to extract concessions from the Houthis, probably involving commitments not to attack Saudi shipping and oil facilities and other vital infrastructure, as they did in February 2021. Current backchannel talks between the Saudis and the Houthis, without the internationally-recognised government, indicate that Saudi Arabia would rather end the conflict than achieve its original goals of eliminating an Iranian ally on its border and containing the effects of terrorism. The strengthening of Houthi power and its show of force through missile attacks around Bab-al-Mandeb, as well as continued close ties with Iran, make evident that the coalition has failed in all its objectives.
What does this mean for Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and the global balance of power?
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia will likely have a hostile government on its borders, one with an incentive to strike the oil-rich Eastern Province. Even though talks have been temporarily suspended, the Saudi Arabian leadership is desperate to extricate itself from the civil war and will likely return to the negotiating table at the first opportunity. Another Iranian proxy, one with access to the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, will rise to power. The rise of the Houthis to power, with a degree of ensuing diplomatic recognition, will be the ultimate regional consolidation of the ‘Axis of Resistance.’ This would further consolidate Iranian power within the Middle East, where Iranian allies are already powerbrokers in Iraq, and key to the governance of Lebanon through Hezbollah. Indeed, Houthi success, in spite of its systematic violation of international norms, may be a symptom of the growth of revanchist powers, not only in the Middle East, but also worldwide.