Logic and Substructurality
Las aproximaciones tradicionales a las paradojas suelen rechazar alguna inferencia que envuelve mención explícita de alguna constante lógica. Por ejemplo, una teoría de la verdad al estilo de Kripke rechaza la validez de la ley de tercio excluso "A o no-A". Con éste, otros principios lógicos son también rechazados, como el axioma de identidad "Si A entonces A". Recientemente, sin embargo, algunas aproximaciones a las paradojas han centrado su atención en propiedades estructurales: principios que gobiernan el comportamiento de la propia relación de consecuencia, sin referencia a ningún ítem específico del vocabulario lógico. Entre estas aproximaciones recientes podemos encontrar propuestas no-reflexivas, no-monotónicas, no-contractivas y no-transitivas. El atractivo de las lógicas subestructurales reside principalmente en la esperanza de sortear la trivialidad generada por las paradojas con un impacto mínimo sobre las inferencias que envuelven vocabulario lógico y, por tanto, sin cambiar el significado de las conectivas lógicas (al menos esto es lo que los defensores de estas teorías sostienen). El estudio de las lógicas subestructurales es a día de hoy uno de los temas candentes dentro de la Lógica Filosófica.
La pregunta que motiva este proyecto es la siguiente: ¿tenemos evidencias razonables para sostener que nuestro razonamiento es subestructural? Nuestra hipótesis inicial es que la respuesta a esta pregunta es afirmativa. Para tratar de responder la pregunta proponemos, en primer lugar estudiar las posibilidades de caracterización semántica de las lógicas subestructurales y, en segundo lugar, el análisis filosófico de los argumentos en contra de la subestructuralidad.
Equipo
Pablo Cobreros, Universidad de Navarra
Paul Egré, Institut Jean Nicod
Rosanna Keefe, University of Sheffield
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe, Universidad de Navarra
David Ripley, University of Melbourne
Robert van Rooij, University of Amsterdam
Lucas Rosenblatt, CONICET - Universidad de Buenos Aires.
Luca Tranchini, Tübingen University
2021
Navarra Workshop on Logical Consequence [DESCARGAR CARTEL] [LEER NOTICIA]
*Logic and Substructurality*
September 24-25, 2021
University of Navarra (Pamplona, Spain)
On-campus attendance: Central Building, Rooms 30 and 32
Online attendance: a link will be sent to registered participantsSpeakers: Maite Aznárez, Pablo Cobreros, Bogdan Dicher, Paul Egré, Martín
Martínez, Peter Odigie, Francesco Paoli, Lucas Rosenblatt (remote), Lorenzo
Rossi, Damian Szmuc (remote), Peter Verdèe.Other participants: Eduardo Barrio (remote), Carlos Benito, José Martínez,
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe, David Ripley (remote), Pilar Terrés.Organizers: Pablo Cobreros, José Martínez, Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe
More information and (free) registration: pilzarbe@unav.es
Funding: Research Project “Logic and Substructurality” (FFI2017-84805-P), Government
of Spain (Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad).
2020
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July 2020. Rosenblatt, L., Logical Deviance, Hypocrisy and Embarrassment, Work in Progress Seminar of the Buenos Aires Logic Group, via Zoom.
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July 2020. Rosenblatt, L., Logical Deviance, Hypocrisy and Embarrassment, Seminar of the London Group for Formal Philosophy, via Zoom.
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January 2020. Tranchini, L. (Keynote speaker) Two approaches to the Russell-Prawitz translation, Days in Logic, Lisbon.
2019
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December 2019. Tranchini, L. Proof, paradox and the semantic role of hypothetical reasoning, Speaking the Unspeakable. Paradoxes between Truth and Proof, Campinas.
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November 2019. Cobreros, P. (I can’t get no) Antisatisfaction. The Logic of Paradox, after 40 years, Bochum.
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November 2019. Cobreros, P. (I can’t get no) Antisatisfaction. IX Meeting of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy, Valencia.
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September 2019. Rosenblatt, L., Maximal Non-Trivial Sets of Instances of your Least Favorite Structural Rule, Workshop on Substructural Logics, Lisbon.
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September 2019. Cobreros, P. Classical and non-classical features of Strong Kleene Logics. Workshop on Substructural Logics, University of Lisbon.
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August 2019. Ripley, D. A typed term calculus for core logic. SADAF (Buenos Aires, Argentina).
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August 5-10, 2019. Tranchini, L. Harmony, stability, and the intensional account of proof-theoretic semantic, 16th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Prague.
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July 2019. Ripley. D. Metainferences and the spirit of classical logic. SADAF, Buenos Aires.
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June 2019. Ripley. D. A typed term calculus for core logic. Keynote, Logica 2019, Hejnice, Czechia.
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June 2019. Cobreros, P. Inferences and Metainferences in ST. Logica 2019, Hejnice, Czechia.
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20 June 2019. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, Workshop on Assertion, Refutation and Meaning, University of Rome "La Sapienza".
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June 2019. Ripley. D. Position-theoretic semantics and entailment. Bilateral approaches to meaning, EXPRESS project, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
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28 June 2019. Cobreros, P. Inferences and Metainferences in ST. Logica 2019, Hejnice, República Checa.
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20 May 2019. Tranchini, L. Anti-realismo, identità tra dimostrazioni e una concezione intensionale della logica', Workshop Mettere ordine al mondo: prospettive logiche ed epistemologiche su scienza, natura, società, University of Venice.
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16 May 2019. Cobreros, P. Substructurality, Non-transitivity and Metainferences. Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Múnich.
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30 March 2019. Tranchini, L. The calculus of higher-level rules in modern dress, Third conference on proof-theoretic semantics, Tübingen University.
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March 2019. Ripley. D. Consequence-theoretic semantics and entailment. Philosophy department, University of Sydney, Sydney.
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March 2019. Ripley. D. Consequence-theoretic semantics and entailment. Melbourne Logic Group, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.
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2019. Rosenblatt, L. Work in Progress Seminar, talk: Expressing Consistency Consistently. Buenos Aires.
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2019. Rosenblatt, L. Bilateral Approaches to Meaning Workshop, talk: Invalidities. Amsterdam.
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2019. Rosenblatt, L. Eight Workshop on Philosophical Logic, talk: Varieties of Classical Recapture. Buenos Aires.
2018
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11 December 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, talk for the Programming Languages research group, Tübingen University, 2018
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29 November 2018. Tranchini, L. Proofs and refutation in 2-intuitionistic logic, research colloquium on Logic and Epistemology, Bochum University, 2018
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October 2018. Ripley. D. Core type theory I: Implication and negation. Melbourne Logic Group, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.
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10–15 September 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, Refutation Symposium at the Poznan Reasoning Week, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan.
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August 2018. Ripley, D. What explains the paradoxes?”. 7th Workshop on Philosophical Logic. SADAF (Buenos Aires, Argentina).
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August 2018. Ripley. D. Containment and analytic entailment. Bradyfest, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.
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July 2018. Ripley. D. Tonk rules and ordering rules. Symposium on draft of Proof Theory and Meaning by Greg Restall. SADAF, Buenos Aires.
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June 2018. Ripley, D. What explains the paradoxes? Semantic Paradox and Revenge. Universität Salzburg (Salzburg, Austria).
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26–27 March 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic, Pisa Spring Workshop on Proof Theory.
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26–28 February 2018. Tranchini, L. A refutation calculus for intuitionistic logic", Second SYSMICS Workshop, Technische Univeristät Vienna.
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2018. Rosenblatt, L. Pluralism and Substructural Logics Workshop, talk: On Structural Contraction and Why it Fails. Barcelona.
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2018. Rosenblatt, L. Symposium on Greg Restall's forthcoming book, talk: Comment on Proof Theory: Rules and Meaning (with Bruno Da Ré), Buenos Aires, 2018.
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2018. Rosenblatt, L. Work in Progress Seminar, talk: On Structural Contraction and Why it Fails. Buenos Aires.
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2018. Rosenblatt, L. Seventh Workshop on Philosophical Logic, talk: Maximal Non-Trivial Sets of Instances of your Least Favorite Logical Principle, Buenos Aires.
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November 2018. Talk "Inferences and Metainferences" by Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarra). Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon.
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November 2018. Cobreros, P. Inferences and Metainferences. IX Conference of the SLMFCE, Madrid.
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October 2018. Talk "Truth, proof and consequence as basic concepts of the theory of meaning" by professor Luca Tranchini (Universität Tubingën). 16:00pm. Seminar room (2280) Department of Philosophy. Second floor, Humanities Library.
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October 2018. Lecture on Natural Deduction by professor Luca Tranchini (Universität Tubingën). 10:00-12:00. Room M6, 1st floor, Edificio de Amigos.
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Rosenblatt, L. (2020), Classical Recapture and Maximality, Philosophical Studies
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Cobreros, P., La Rosa, E. and Tranchini, L. (2020) (I can’t get no) Antisatisfaction, Synthese.
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Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D. and van Rooij, R. (2020) Inferences and Metainferences in ST, Journal of Philosophical Logic, OA.
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Rosenblatt, L. (2020), Maximal Non-Trivial Sets of Instances of your Least Favourite Logical Principle, The Journal of Philosophy 117(1): 30-54.
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Schroeder-Heister, P. and Tranchini, L. (2019) How to Ekman a Crabbé-Tennant. Synthese, Online First. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02018-
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Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D. and van Rooij, R. (2019) Tolerant reasoning: nontransitive or nonmonotonic? Synthese OA.
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Cobreros, P. and Tranchini, L. (2019) S’valuationism, The Sorites Paradox, Sergi Oms and Elia Zardini (eds) Cambridge University Press.
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French R., and Ripley, D. (2019) Valuations: bi, tri, and tetra. Studia Logica 107(6):1313–1346, 2019.
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Rosenblatt, L. (2019), Bilateralism and Invalidities, Inquiry.
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Rosenblatt, L. (2019b), On Structural Contraction and Why it Fails, Synthese.
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Rosenblatt, L. (2019a), Non-Contractive Classical Logic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60(4): 559-585.
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Schroeder-Heister, P., Tranchini, L. (2019) How to Ekman a Crabbé-Tennant" Synthese, Online First. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02018-3 OA
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Tranchini, L. (2019) Proof, meaning and paradox. Some remarks. Topoi, 38(3):591–603.
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Beall, Jc. and Ripley, D. (2018) Nonclassical theories of truth. The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Michael Glanzberg, ed, pp 739–754. Oxford University Press.
Contacto
Pablo Cobreros Bordenave
pcobreros@unav.esCampus Universitario s/n
31009 Pamplona, España
+34 948 425 600
Financiado por:
Proyecto FFI2017-84805-P