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India’s Prime Minister Modi inaugurates first Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi [X/@narendramodi]
Since coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Modi has pursued a Hindu nationalism-based approach to politics in India. Hindutva advocates for Hindu Identity as synonymous with Indian identity, thus excluding other minority religious communities from the idea of India. While this approach has provided electoral success to Modi’s Political Party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, it has also been the subject of internal and external international criticism.
This paper analyzes India’s political changes. The aim is to assess whether Modi’s Hindutva policies are influencing its status as a global power and to evaluate the impact of his leadership on neighbouring Muslim countries.
India has always faced many invasions by foreign kingdoms, making it a melting pot of different religions, cultures, and ethnicities. However, India has a history of living in unity with diverse cultures. A new threat arose during British colonization when the unity of religions in India was broken and divided, with the British systematically promoting the policy of ‘divide and rule.’ After decolonization, religious divisions have existed in India but have not received state legitimacy and structural support the way they have since 2014. The election of Modi and his pro-Hindu BJP have been marked with a discriminatory approach towards minorities in India and religious majoritarianism with the help of a Hindu-right wing group, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). RSS’ main objective was created under a broad network of Hindutva organizations, Sangh Parivar, to advance Hindu nationalistic principles and realize their vision for a Hindu homeland. Repeatedly, both Modi and the RSS have threatened the secular principles enshrined in the Indian constitution. Article 15 of the Indian constitution explicitly talks about the “prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.” The connection between the BJP and the RSS is not an unknown factor, as the two rely on each other to implement Hindutva policies and the creation of a Hindu state in India.
The cooperation between the RSS and Modi became apparent over the question of a disputed mosque, the Babri Masjid, which stood at a site claimed to be the birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama. Under the BJP government, tensions escalated, leading to the mosque's destruction in 1992 amid a campaign against Muslims. On November 9, 2019, the Supreme Court controversially ruled in favor of the Hindu group, asserting that the mosque was built on the ruins of a previous Hindu temple. This judgment granted Hindus ownership of the land, which supporters celebrated as a significant political victory.
In the years following 2014, Modi’s repressive Hindutva regulations grew, and his actions made his anti-minority, especially anti-Islamic sentiment, in India more evident. The ban on cow meat was enacted in 2015, which prohibits the killing of cows, which are sacred animals to Hindus. Also known as the Gauvansh Sanrakshan and Gausamvardhan Bill, after undergoing two amendments, it has enforced a complete ban on the sale of beef. This legislation stipulates a minimum imprisonment of three years for anyone caught slaughtering cows or selling beef, with the possibility of the sentence extending up to ten years. BJP’s cow protection movement targets minorities with vigilantism, with Hindus promising to save cows from Muslims or Christians from eating beef and conducting violent attacks.
The most notable Hindutva policy was the Citizenship Amendment Act, or the CAA, enacted in 2020. The CAA was established as a fast-tracked citizenship for Hindu, Christian, Buddhist, Parsi, Jain, and Sikh immigrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, it does not include Muslims. BJP’s intention with the enactment of the CAA is to ensure the protection of vulnerable religious minorities who face discrimination in countries such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. The CAA has caused widespread internal and international protests in Muslim neighbouring countries. Moreover, the efforts by the BJP to define an "illegal migrant" using the National Population Register (NPR) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC) have raised serious concerns regarding millions of Indian Muslims losing their citizenship rights or becoming disenfranchised.
In 2024, the BJP government revoked Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which provides Jammu and Kashmir, India’s sole Muslim-majority state, with special autonomous status. Article 35A, from Article 370, allowed Jammu and Kashmir to define "permanent residents" and grant them special rights, including property ownership and access to government jobs and scholarships. Therefore, the revocation of Article 370 removed the special rights that were the only form of privilege for Muslim residents in the Kashmir valley.
Such policies have raised the possible risk of human rights violations in India and have alarmed India’s neighbours, especially the Muslim states. India’s heavy dependence on the Gulf countries for oil and gas exponentially increases India’s vulnerability to the economy. Historically, India has had close connections with the Gulf countries since the British colonial period, when the Arabian Peninsula was managed from Bombay. After India’s independence, Pakistan's close relations with the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, limited India’s ability to engage in economic trade in the Gulf. During the post-Cold War period, with the policies of economic liberalization, India’s foreign policy increased its reliance on Gulf countries for energy security.
India’s relations with the Gulf countries
India’s strategic and economic partnership with the Gulf countries remains consistently stable for two primary reasons. Firstly, India and the Gulf countries share a profound concern regarding terrorism and extremist ideologies that have been shaped by historical events, such as the Arab Uprisings of 2011-2012, the series of terrorist attacks in India, and notably the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Secondly, the stability of Indo-Gulf relations is driven by strong economic ties, particularly in the energy sector, as the Gulf has become a crucial oil supplier to India.
India’s security engagement with the Persian Gulf countries is principally structured by a shared perceived threat posed by international terrorism. This sentiment increased following the Arab Spring uprisings, which presented challenges for the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. As a result, Indo-Gulf relations primarily revolve around concerns about the rise of political Islam rather than Modi’s anti-Muslim policies in India. This indicates that India’s key oil suppliers in the Gulf region have not taken a more confrontational approach to managing disputes with the Modi government. Aside from the backlash faced by India when BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma made televised comments about the Prophet Muhammad that were deemed Islamophobic by Qatar, Kuwait, or UAE, Indo-Gulf relations remain largely unaffected. The mutual concern over the threat of terrorism is prominently reflected in the diplomatic field between India and important supplier countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. For Indo-Saudi relations, it is evidenced in The Riyadh Declaration in 2010, which India’s previous Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and
Geopolitics helped enhance commercial trade, benefiting India, as the Gulf has become one of the biggest regional blocs and the primary actor securing India’s oil supply. During the early 2000s, emphasis was placed on Indo-Gulf diplomatic relations, with several mutual visits enacted with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani visited New Delhi in April 1999, and the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, visited Riyadh in January 2001. In 2006, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia visited India as chief guest for Republic Day, marking a monumental occasion in Saudi-India relations.
Therefore, it is unsurprising for India to use its strong ties with the Gulf countries to counter Pakistan’s ability to advance any further security relations in the region and for India to use its diplomatic efforts to pressure Pakistan regarding cross-border terrorism and the Kashmir issue.
India’s relations with the neighbouring Muslim countries
The situation may be different, however, for India’s relations with its neighbouring Muslim states. Their increasing cooperation with each other to stop the spread of anti-muslim sentiments by the BJP. India is finding connections with more prominent superpowers, such as the US to combat terrorism.
Pakistan
At first, India maintained a policy of avoiding military alliances with other nations, distancing itself from the US. During this time, India’s reluctance to engage with the United States allowed China and Pakistan to strengthen their ties with Washington. However, the September 11 attacks in 2001 represented a significant turning point in U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan; previously viewed as an ally, Pakistan's harboring of Osama bin Ladenprompted the US to adopt a more critical stance. In this evolving context, the US-India Nuclear Deal approved by Congress in 2008, marked a historical milestone in improvements in bilateral relations, lifting a three-decade moratorium on nuclear trade with India and providing assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program while also expanding collaboration in energy and satellite technology. Furthermore, Trump’s presidency further sealed Indo-US relations when military aid to Pakistan was halted over allegations of terrorist ties.
India-Pakistani relations have always been tense since 1947, when the two states retained independence. India-Pakistani relations further deteriorated under Modi’s accession to power in 2014, with the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A and the passage of the CAA. The progress of any bilateral agreements has been stalled because of a series of defensive international declarations each nation has made regarding the Kashmir issue. Pakistan publicly demanded a global response to India’s abuses of the rights of the Kashmiri people after removing Kashmir’s autonomy and encouraging International action against Modi’s policies towards Muslimsat the UN General Assembly. India delisted Pakistan as a Most Favored Nation (MFN) nation once the Kashmir dispute erupted. However, Pakistan doesn’t hold as much power over India as the oil-supplying Gulf countries; therefore, its power to change India’s foreign policy is limited, and its only choice is to turn to China for change. A significant source of irritation for India is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which further intends to strengthen China’s strategic ties with Pakistan, as Pakistan has allowed China to build in the disputed Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s reaction to criticism of Modi’s religious majoritarianism resembles that of Pakistan, yet the level of domestic outrage appears less intense compared to the country's firm stance in international discussions on the matter. The implementation of the CAA and the NRC has emboldened right-wing Islamist groups to attack Hindus in Bangladesh, with over 3,600 incidents reported in recent years. Internationally, Bangladesh has kept the criticism very vague as it has only criticized India's actions in contexts where it would face little backlash from the global community, such as during the 2023 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference. This illustrates Bangladesh prioritizes its domestic interests over confronting a powerful state like India.
Indonesia
In the ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia have also reacted against India’s Hindutva policies. Indonesia, one of the largest Muslim countries, publicly spoke out against the CAA. Different Islamic organizations held demonstrations in front of the Indian embassy and urged the Indonesian government to take action or dismiss the Indian Ambassador, who desired to clear up any strains in their bilateral relations. However, Indonesia follows a strategy similar to Bangladesh: it does not interfere with India’s internal affairs and prefers economic interests over confronting India.
Malaysia
The Malaysian government has voiced concerns regarding the rising Islamophobia in India. Officials, including the Foreign minister, have warned that increasing anti-Muslim sentiments could significantly impact Muslim communities within ASEAN. This critique of India’s policies, coupled with past controversies involving former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, showcases Malaysia’s cautious approach towards the Hindutva agenda. Additionally, the BJP's condemnation of the persecution faced by Hindus and people of Indian origin in Malaysia reflects the ongoing tensions between the two nations.
Assessing the impact
In conclusion, Prime Minister Modi's nearly decade-long prime ministership has exerted a significant influence on India’s Muslim demographic by establishing a religious hierarchy that places Hinduism at the forefront, undermining the civil rights of Indian Muslims. The BJP and RSS commenced their violent campaigns, promoting the Hindutva, with the Babri Masjid dispute, consequently with the Citizenship Amendment Act, and lastly, the revocation of Article 370.
India’s already strained relations with Pakistan have deteriorated further. At the same time, Bangladesh has expressed concerns over the CAA but has primarily opted for a soft diplomatic approach, not risking its economic stability over confrontation with India. Following a similar path, Malaysia and Indonesia have voiced their disapproval of BJP’s regulations, repeatedly the CAA, but have chosen to avoid jeopardizing bilateral relations with India.
A contradictory pattern emerges in Bangladesh and other prominent Muslim countries. While the governments engage in diplomatic actions using soft power toward India, their official responses tend to be more restrained and diluted. In contrast, non-state actors in these countries have reacted strongly and with resentment to Hindutva policies, showcased through widespread protests and attacks.
Despite their criticisms of specific incidents, the GGC countries, which hold the most power over hindering India’s ability to operate economically, remain focused on energy security and uphold the conjoint Indo-Gulf extremist approach, choosing pragmatism over resolving India’s domestic issues.
While assessing whether Modi’s directives influence India’s status as a global power, the controversial Hindutva policies have drawn criticism from neighbouring Muslim states, and their verbal impact on India’s international standing has been minimal. On one hand, Hindutva tarnishes India’s ‘image’ as a unitary, democratic nation, potentially weakening its soft power and moral authority. On the contrary, they have not destabilized India’s ‘ability’ to operate as an emergent power. Its economic strength, strategic partnerships with the GGC countries, and role in counterterrorism efforts remain largely unaffected, as most countries prioritize pragmatic interests over ideological disputes.